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The short-haul operations of traditional European airlines such as British Airways and 
Lufthansa have come under increasing pressure from the growth of low-cost carriers. This 
paper examines their competitive responses. These are found to include reductions in 
labour costs, greater use of regional aircraft and a run-down of secondary hubs. Minimum 
stay requirements on cheap fares have been axed in many markets, while changes to the on-
board service and a move to direct-sell bring these airlines closer to the low-cost carrier 
product. The network strength is largely maintained however, which appears a better 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The established European airlines have all come under pressure in the last few years, with a 
collapse in profitability and doubt cast over their traditional business model. Meanwhile, 
there has been dramatic growth by the low-cost airlines and other new entrants. Although 
much has been written of the low-cost carriers’ performance - for example, see Lawton 
(2002), Gudmundsson et al (2005), Doganis (2006), Civil Aviation Authority (2006) - 
relatively little research has taken place on the reactions of the traditional airlines.  
 
Some of the European majors such as British Airways (BA), Aer Lingus and Lufthansa 
face low-cost competition across a substantial part of their short-haul network. Others such 
as Air France, Austrian or TAP Air Portugal only have significant exposure on routes to the 
UK at the present time. 
 
This paper aims to assess the strategies adopted by the major airlines in reaction to the 
competitive threat from low-cost carriers. These include means of reducing labour costs or 
increasing productivity within the mainline airline operation. There is also the possibility of 
transferring services to regional partners, franchises or alliances and even setting up a low-
cost carrier subsidiary. Services and procedures have also come under scrutiny. Areas such 
as distribution costs have been brought closer to the low-cost airline model by reducing or 
scrapping commission payments to travel agents. British Airways and bmi have revised 
their fare structures to remove minimum stays on the cheaper tickets for most European 
sectors. Catering in economy class is generally on a downward spiral with airlines such as 
 Aer Lingus, bmi and SAS moving to paid for refreshments and some others offering only 
non- alcoholic beverages. Charter airlines such as Monarch have moved into the scheduled 
business while Thomsonfly offers seat only charters on a range of new routes. 
 
The success of these approaches has been rather variable. In particular, few of the low-cost 
subsidiaries have been very successful, suggesting it is difficult to run two brands under the 
same roof. British Airways is generally accredited with having the most realistic strategy 
for dealing with the low-cost airlines, perhaps alongside Aer Lingus who are the only real 
example of a traditional network airline converting much of the way into a low-cost carrier 
(Aviation Strategy, 2004b). Others have done the minimum by changing strategy only 
where head-to-head with either a low-cost airline or BA. Some have adopted aggressive 
tactics through legal procedures or control of slots, facilities or capacity to keep new 
entrants out. 
 
2. Raise labour productivity and outsource more services 
 
One area where the low-cost airlines have made significant savings over the traditional 
carriers is in terms of labour costs. The major airlines have tried to revise their wage costs 
downwards through various measures including increasing productivity, freezing or 
reducing salaries or benefits, hiring new staff on less generous terms and conditions and 
outsourcing more activities, including selling off or transferring to third parties support 
services that were previously done in-house (catering, ground handling etc). Employment 
with the major airlines was historically a comfortable existence. Once easyJet, Ryanair etc 
 found there were staff willing to work in the airline industry for much less, it became 
difficult to justify maintaining these generous conditions.  
 
Table 1 shows the changes over the last five years for major UK scheduled airlines and a 
selection of other European carriers.  
 
It can be seen that traffic has generally grown faster than employee numbers. In many cases 
the number of staff on the books has actually gone down. This has led to a superficially 
improved productivity indicator (RPK/employee). These have to be treated with caution 
however. Stage length is a critical factor in determining the absolute RPK/employee 
figures. Some of the largest changes have been achieved by selling off whole departments 
(e.g. ground handling at bmi). easyJet and Ryanair have achieved their dramatic growth in 
productivity by taking on the bare minimum of extra flight and cabin crew to support their 
vastly expanded operations. This has spread administrative staff over more passengers, 
while everything else is contracted out. The UK and Irish airlines have generally moved 
further in this direction than their European counterparts. Staff at BA ought to be worried 
by the changes Willie Walsh instituted during his time at Aer Lingus! The first signs of this 
came with a cull of managers in Winter 2005/06, reducing this group of staff by about a 
third. The KLM/Air France figures are hard to explain and may be down simply to changes 
of definition. 
 
Unlike the low-cost carriers, the major airlines have not generally tried to shift any flight 
and cabin crew to lower cost economies. They still put a large number of crew in expensive 
 accommodation away from home to operate early morning flights from other countries, 
rather than setting up a local crew base. BA even does this on domestic sectors where a 
particular fleet is based at the opposite end of the route (e.g. 737 crews overnight away 
from Gatwick at Edinburgh). 
 
Support services such as catering, cleaning and ground handling have come under much 
more severe pressure (Stewart and Michaels, 2003). These providers may rue the day they 
did a deal with Ryanair or easyJet on a marginal cost basis. At that time, these airlines were 
small players and it was seen as useful incremental extra business. The assumption was that 
the traditional airlines would continue paying 'normal rates' which covered the full cost of 
the service plus a profit margin. However the majors have been forced to renegotiate their 
contracts to remain competitive, in some cases reducing service standards as well. Caterers 
are in the bleakest position as food provision has generally fallen across the board. Gate 
Gourmet's revenue fell 30% from 2000-04 despite a growth in passenger numbers (Ott, 
2005). Low-cost airlines now account for a large part of the market and along with those 
traditional carriers selling refreshments have complicated procedures while shifting the risk 
of wastage onto the suppliers. The high profile dispute at Gate Gourmet which crippled 
BA's Heathrow operation in Summer 2005 is indicative of the problems in the industry. 
Contract prices have fallen well below costs as supply exceeds demand leading to huge 
losses (Lufthansa's LSG Sky Chefs is in a similar predicament). Staff - many of whom may 
have once worked for BA's own catering operation under much better terms and conditions 
before it was outsourced - have taken the brunt of the pain. Handling companies are barely 
in a healthier position (witness recent industrial disputes at Aviance, for example). Aircraft 
 maintenance is in somewhat better shape. The going rate for routine maintenance is fairly 
static as skilled engineers in a country such as the UK come at a price and everyone has to 
pay up. The main area where maintenance costs can be cut is through conducting heavy 
maintenance in lower cost economies, particularly eastern Europe. Lufthansa Technik for 
example, now has a base in Budapest for such activities. 
 
Growth provides an alternative means for traditional airlines to improve productivity 
without reducing staff numbers. Lufthansa have favoured this course of action, adding new 
capacity faster than average in recent years (Flottau, 2005). BA on the other hand has been 
more ruthless in holding capacity down and conceding market share in an aim to avoid 
yields plummeting further. It is debatable as to how sustainable lower cost levels are. The 
majors are likely to be blighted by industrial action if they try to cut further while if the 
third party providers go out of business, contracts will have to be re-tendered at a higher 
level - which may turn the pressure onto the low-cost airlines. Nevertheless, it is still 
viewed as essential for the major carriers to reduce their cost-base if they are to stand any 
chance of remaining competitive in the future commercial environment (Franke, 2004). 
 
3. More use of regional aircraft 
 
In the United States, one of the most noticeable impacts of the increased competition faced 
by the 'legacy' carriers has been the transfer of many short-haul routes to regional partner 
airlines. There are two main reasons behind this. Where market share has been eroded by 
low-cost carriers such as Southwest it enables the major airline to maintain frequency (an 
 important competitive weapon, especially when linked to frequent flier programmes -FFPs) 
whilst reducing capacity. In theory, this also enables yields to be maintained as it is the less 
valuable passengers on lower fares that will be turned away. The second reason is that the 
regional partners operate under a much lower labour cost regime than the majors have been 
able to achieve. Thus although aircraft such as the CRJ200 inherently have higher unit costs 
than a Boeing 737, for example, this has distorted the market, making the regional jets 
lower-cost to operate overall (Table 2). The recent surge in fuel prices means that many of 
these routes would be more efficiently served with a turboprop or large jet but the amount 
of regional jet flying has grown too large to unwind. 
 
In Europe, there has been much less shift to regional jets due to capacity constraints at the 
major hub airports. The opportunity cost of using a precious slot for a 50 seater aircraft is 
enough to tip the balance in favour of the larger jets. At locations such as Manchester, 
however, which have seen their traffic base for traditional scheduled services eroded by 
low-cost operations at nearby airports, particularly Liverpool, there has been a considerable 
amount of trading down to smaller aircraft. This has been facilitated by the extra runway 
capacity available since the opening of a second runway in 2001.  
 
Table 3 shows that British Airways has replaced 737s on routes such as Dusseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Geneva and Paris with regional jets, at similar or higher frequency but offering 
much less capacity. BA also has been squeezed on some of these sectors by the foreign 
carrier strengthening service into its hub (Manchester-Paris, for example, is a hub feeder for 
Air France but a point-to-point route for BA). On Manchester-Amsterdam the combined 
 forces of KLM and three nearby low-cost routes have led to BA withdrawing. Belfast 
International and Knock are the other routes that BA has abandoned to the low-cost 
airlines. A number of new services have been added; some like Lyon or Oslo are business 
type routes with no direct competition whilst BA has also pitched in to places such as Nice 
and Venice which are dominated by the low-cost sector. BA however launched a further 
round of cutbacks in the Manchester operation (Crawshaw, 2005) and it is particularly the 
newer routes with low-cost competition that have received the axe. At the end of 2006, 
news came that BA was planning to transfer its regional operations (BA Connect) to flybe. 
 
4. Run-down of secondary hubs 
 
The major airlines have retrenched onto their main hub airports, reducing or abandoning 
secondary hubs and point-to-point services. This process was already underway due to hub 
domination, which made it difficult to compete with carriers flying from a hub at the other 
end of the route (as in the Manchester-Amsterdam case above). The low-cost industry has 
rapidly identified any other free-standing point-to-point services of the majors as the softest 
targets. Lufthansa (major hubs Frankfurt and Munich) and SAS (major hub Copenhagen) 
are particularly exposed here because of their large European networks from cities such as 
Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Berlin and Stuttgart (Lufthansa); Oslo, Gothenburg and Stockholm 
(SAS). Swiss has also largely withdrawn at Geneva and Basel. Table 4 shows how at 
Geneva, Swiss has cut from 25 routes to 7 in the last 8 years.  
 
 Some secondary hubs have continued, at least so far. Air France, for example, faces little 
competition out of Lyon and has actually redeployed resources here at the expense of some 
of its other airports. It is operated as a proper hub with waves of connecting flights, unlike 
other second tier cities (e.g. BA at Manchester), which offers a degree of protection. 
Barcelona appears to be a sufficiently thriving centre that it can support growth from Iberia 
as well as booming low-cost services, including Ryanair's base at nearby Gerona.    
 
5. Revise pricing and remove minimum stays on low fares 
 
Traditional airlines developed a very sophisticated system of yield management that aimed 
to minimise consumer surplus and divide the market according to different degrees of 
willingness and ability to pay (Tretheway, 2004). The consequence was a wide range of 
different fares for essentially the same product. The cheaper fares were surrounded with 
conditions, the most onerous of which was the requirement to spend a Saturday night away 
in order to obtain a discount tariff. The cheaper fares were hence sold only on a round-trip 
basis. This neatly divided the market on the assumption that anyone returning before the 
weekend must be a business passenger and hence have low elasticity to price as they would 
not be paying their own fare. Cheap fares were hence reserved for leisure passengers who 
stayed away over the weekend. Flexibility was only available at the higher fares, again 
making cheap tickets unattractive to business passengers whose travel plans may change 
frequently. 
 
 The low-cost airlines, particularly easyJet in Europe, started offering one-way fares. They 
still operated differential pricing but the only relevant factors now were the time of travel 
(peak/off-peak etc) and how far ahead the ticket was purchased. Initially the major carriers 
lived in denial, believing that business passengers would continue to buy expensive full-
fare tickets in order to benefit from high frequency service from convenient airports with 
FFP credit. Business passengers started leaching away to the low-cost airlines, as did 
leisure passengers who wanted the ability to make a cheap midweek trip. When the damage 
could be contained to one or two routes, the risks of dilution (business passengers who 
would have paid a full fare trading down) outweighed the traffic being lost. Once British 
Airways was facing low-cost competition on most of its short-haul network however this 
couldn't be ignored any longer. In 2002, BA abandoned the minimum stay requirement for 
cheap fares on short-haul travel originating in the UK. They did not go as far as the low-
cost airlines however. BA still requires a return journey which enables some sophistication 
in changing the fare of the return flight depending on the outward flight that has been 
chosen. It also means that the cheap flights are not necessarily the same for passengers 
starting at opposite ends of the route. For example, an 0800 flight on Wednesday morning 
may be cheap if booked as a return sector but high as an outbound sector. A 1700 return 
flight on Monday evening may be cheap if the passenger flew out the previous week but 
high if flying out the same Monday morning. BA still requires a minimum stay of 2 nights 
for cheap fares from certain European countries, where it is effectively matching the local 
carrier (e.g. Iberia or Swiss) rather than easyJet. The low-cost airlines generally base their 
aircraft in Britain and so cannot offer competitive timings for short trips from Europe to the 
UK. bmi went a step further by pricing on a single journey basis. This means that on routes 
 where BA and bmi compete the one way fares are often more expensive on BA (as 
constrained by the highest pricing quoted as part of a return journey). BA made some one-
way seats available at lower fares through consolidators - typically on routes from Gatwick 
where they go head-to-head with easyJet (e.g. Gatwick-Amsterdam; Unijet were quoting a 
one-way fare of £59 on BA in January 2005 as against a published fare of £158). Cheaper 
one-way fares are now available on ba.com - but typically only on off-peak or Gatwick 
flights. From Heathrow, to discourage mixing a one-way with the foreign airline to get the 
preferred timings, single flights at business times remain high.  
 
The response of the other European airlines on pricing has been variable. Table 5 
summarises the latest position on short-haul international routes within Europe. Some such 
as Air France have matched BA for bookings in the UK but continue to cling to their 
beloved Saturday night rules and no flexible tickets other than business class on the rest of 
their European network. Others such as KLM haven't even matched BA where they are 
head-to-head. Lufthansa has some cheap flights on Germany-UK routes without a 
minimum stay requirement but typically at very poor times. SAS has recently moved 
towards pricing the legs of a return journey separately (Travel Trade Gazette, 2005) but this 
is hardly the achievement it is made out to be - merely emulating BA's structure - it is still 
not possible to buy cheap one way tickets. easyJet made all tickets flexible as a response to 
the lower fares with fixed reservations introduced by the major airlines. However, the 
difference in price still has to be paid between the original fare and the selling rate on the 
new flight at the time the change is made, as well as an administration charge. As fares are 
increased dramatically close to departure this is not a realistic option for many passengers. 
 British Airways, Aer Lingus, Lufthansa, Iberia and Alitalia have now adopted similar 
tactics, as it represents a means of increasing revenue from low-fare passengers rather than 
simply having them not travel or buy a new ticket elsewhere. 
 
Table 6 provides a snapshot of pricing strategies for a midweek day return trip, booked 
three weeks ahead on routes to/from London. This was chosen to see where the major 
carriers have become more competitive for advance booking on short duration midweek 
trips and where they still have minimum stay rules in place. Restricted tickets were 
permitted in the analysis, although in some cases only an unrestricted ticket at a very high 
fare was offered. On London-Amsterdam, the KLM fare is over £300 without a two night 
minimum stay. VLM on the City Airport route is much below KLM. BA or bmi are 
available for just over £100 return. easyJet offers a significant price advantage over all the 
other airlines on this route (around half the BA rates). It is difficult to see who would 
choose KLM for a day trip unless the company is paying and they want the FFP miles or 
they require a flexible ticket and the KLM flight is at the most convenient time.  
 
On London-Paris there is less inter-airline competition. Air France matches BA and bmi 
from Heathrow. The main alternative comes from the train (Eurostar). Booking at least 3 
weeks ahead Eurostar offers £59 return to 'leisure travellers only' (what happens if you turn 
up with a suit and briefcase?!). Otherwise they don't go below £199 return for a day trip 
midweek, making the airlines potentially cheaper. Air France makes no attempt to match 
BA out of Paris and easyJet offers less price advantage - presumably no-one chooses Luton 
to travel to Paris unless it is more convenient than the other airports and Waterloo, in which 
 case they have a captive market. bmi (and also Air France on the LCY route) can't offer a 
viable day trip schedule if starting in Paris. Airline pricing behaviour in the London-Paris 
market was studied in more detail by Pels and Rietveld (2004). 
 
For London-Geneva the most interesting feature is BA's differential pricing depending 
whether one starts from the London or the Geneva end of the route. Swiss have a medium 
fare of £220 return from Geneva - the flight is ironically operated by BA who charge at 
least £395. easyJet is not much cheaper for London originating passengers - indeed BA 
beats them by £3 out of Gatwick! 
 
Finally, Madrid-London perhaps raises the greatest competition concerns. BA has an 
alliance with Iberia and for Madrid residents making a day trip to London, it is still the 
good old days here for the airlines with BA charging £688 and Iberia £697. easyJet can 
only offer a day trip if starting from London and once again they are more expensive than 
BA out of Gatwick. bmi only offers one flight per day. 
 
6. Charge for catering or reduce free provision 
 
Economy class passengers making international journeys within Europe have traditionally 
been served a hot or cold meal depending on the time of day and length of route. The first 
attempt to adapt this came when BA introduced the separate Club and Tourist products 
more than twenty years ago. Club passengers received upgraded catering whilst Tourist had 
a carry-on sandwich bag on longer flights and nothing on short hops. Few carriers matched 
 BA's provision (indeed British Midland made a virtue out of its 'diamond service' for all) so 
for competitive reasons, the airline was forced to return to a conventional food service in 
economy. Non-alcoholic beverages have always been free and during the 1980s the move 
towards free drinks across the network meant that most European airlines started offering 
complimentary wine or beer as well. Domestic catering has traditionally been minimal in 
some countries (France, Spain, Italy). In the UK, BA only operated one cabin and so 
enhanced catering with hot meals was available to all passengers. Until recently, most of 
these routes were dominated by business traffic. 
 
It was not until the last five years that the growth of the low-cost carriers, which either 
offered no catering or a basic paid-for service ('no frills'), forced a revaluation of the short-
haul product by the traditional airlines. The difference over the 1980s was that passengers 
then saw no price incentive for foregoing the food and drink. Now with fares half or less 
those of the major airlines available from Ryanair or easyJet, the free catering (which many 
passengers never much liked anyway) suddenly became the most visible symbol of 
difference between the two sectors. 
 
There has since been a gradual drift to reducing provision in economy class by the 
traditional airlines. As well as saving money, this has the added benefit of allowing the 
business class product to become more differentiated, encouraging the 'service seekers' to 
trade up. The argument is that no-one buys an air ticket because of the food. Therefore if 
the ticket price can be cut by £5 through cutting out the food, that will be more 
commercially successful. The danger for the traditional airlines however is that they can 
 never match the cost levels - and hence the average fares - of Ryanair or easyJet. If 
inclusive economy class catering is eliminated, passengers may then see no reason for using 
these airlines. 
 
The evidence however is less supportive of traditional services. In the US, all the legacy 
carriers have rushed to strip out catering provision on short-haul flights. They believe the 
Frequent Flier Programme is the only 'frill' valued by the passenger (and perhaps in-flight 
entertainment on longer routes, a major selling point of Jet Blue). Most of these airlines 
have been doing extremely badly however, not helped by the negative passenger perception 
that comes from no in-flight service, disillusioned staff and fares that are still often higher 
than Southwest or Jet Blue.  
 
In Europe, Aer Lingus has gone to paid for catering only. Prices are reasonable and the 
menu comprehensive compared to the low-cost carriers. A Full Irish Breakfast is available 
until 1000 hours at 7 euro. At other times a hot ham and cheese panini is 5 euro (Aer 
Lingus, 2005). Maersk of Denmark (now part of Sterling Blue) was another airline that 
made an early move in this direction, their style being copied shortly afterwards by SAS. 
Iberia, Swiss and Austrian subsequently shifted to paid for food and drink also.  
 
The problem with paid for catering however is that it is a rather inefficient process. Axing 
all food saves money because turn-around is speeded up as the aircraft does not need to be 
cleaned and catered, galley space can be replaced with seats and cabin staff can be reduced 
in number to the safety minimum. If the same free sandwich is provided to everyone than it 
 is only necessary to load the requisite number then dash round the aircraft handing them 
out. Once passengers are given an option of purchasing items then cabin staff have to waste 
time going to and from the galley, collecting money and giving change in different 
currencies and with a choice of items, either some passengers will be disappointed or a lot 
of wastage will occur. The take-up will be variable from flight to flight making it difficult 
to plan efficiently. 
 
The complications coupled with the negative image it conveys prompted Lufthansa to 
reinstate free catering on Swiss a few months after taking them over. This brought the 
Swiss product back into line with Lufthansa.  
 
Amongst the airlines still offering free catering within Europe, BA has trimmed back 
provision on shorter routes to only biscuits between 1000-1200 and 1400-1700 with a 
sandwich from the 'All Day Deli' at other times. On domestic routes, hot breakfast is still 
available until 1000 (continental breakfast to Europe and Ireland). Hot paninis are favoured 
on longer routes. A full range of free drinks is offered from the bar. KLM and Lufthansa 
basically offer a sandwich and a drink (KLM did not offer alcoholic drinks even for 
payment in economy but has now reinstated these for consistency with Air France). Air 
France is generally a bit sparser on food, with only biscuits on domestic routes and between 
main meal times. SN Brussels are slightly more generous with some of the traditional frills 
such as sweets before take-off, hot croissants, chocolates offered with tea/coffee and hot 
freshen-up towels. 
 
 bmi has recently moved to paid for catering in economy class from Heathrow and axed 
business class except to Edinburgh, Glasgow, Belfast, Dublin and Brussels. bmi regional 
flights are all economy class and continue to provide free refreshments however (unless 
travelling to the Channel Islands or Ireland). The phrase 'dog's dinner' found some 
resonance with journalists and (at least before the Gate Gourmet crisis), BA hoped to attract 
higher yield passengers who became fed up with the uncertainties and inconsistencies that 
bmi were creating (Jamieson, 2005). The future of catering on BA short-haul flights must 
be under a cloud with Willie Walsh having superceded Rod Eddington. Whereas Eddington 
had tried to differentiate the carrier with a 'value' proposition, Walsh's approach at Aer 
Lingus was that cutting cost by cutting frills was the way to move forward: 'if you can't beat 
'em join 'em'. At Dublin, Ryanair's HQ is just across the car park from Aer Lingus and the 
passengers are mainly holidaymakers or visiting friends and relatives. Whether this applies 
at Heathrow (when Ryanair operate from Stansted) is still open to debate. The carrier that 
BA has tended to benchmark itself against over the years is Lufthansa and as long as they 
are still providing free catering, there is at least some pressure to maintain the status quo. In 
March 2006 however, the regional services of BA CitiExpress (from Manchester, 
Birmingham, Edinburgh etc) were re-branded as BA Connect, with reduced fares and a 
single cabin offering paid-for food and drink. As with Aer Lingus the menu is extensive 
and good value, perhaps reflecting the need to continue to find productive use for the on-
board galley facilities and staff. BA still maintains its traditional product on Heathrow and 
Gatwick based aircraft and also the four routes from London City, despite the latter being 
operated by BA Connect. Franchises have maintained the full product from the London 
 airports but GB Airways has matched BA Connect with charges for food and drink out of 
Manchester and Loganair charges for alcoholic beverages in Scotland. 
 
7. Abandon business class 
 
Whereas in long-haul markets there will always be some passengers willing to pay more for 
sleeper seats, it is difficult to offer passengers additional comfort features that add 
significant value on short-haul European routes. Business class significantly increases unit 
costs but for most of the major airlines there remain several rationale for continuing to offer 
it. Firstly, it is necessary to provide passengers connecting to first and business class long-
haul flights with a segregated product on the short-haul feeder routes. Otherwise they are 
likely to desert to rival carriers and these travellers are valuable for their long-haul revenue. 
Secondly, many of the European airlines still do not face low-cost competition on much of 
their short-haul network. Thus they can maintain traditional practices on pricing, forcing 
trips without a Saturday night stay into business class. Thirdly, some passengers (or their 
employers) are still willing to pay for the highest level of service available and if the 
additional revenue received more than offsets the marginal costs of providing the premium 
cabin then it is sensible to do so. 
 
Almost all European 'flag carriers' still offer a two-class cabin on short-haul international 
routes with aircraft of Boeing 737 size or larger. Aer Lingus is the only exception to this 
rule. It now operates a single class in Europe but with all passengers able to purchase a 
range of hot and cold food. 
  
Some airlines also offer business class on the 100 seater equipment such as the Avro RJ or 
Fokker 100. On aircraft in the 50 seat range there is typically only one class. 
 
Many airlines only offer one-class on their domestic network. These routes are usually 
short-sectors with either a semi-monopoly position (e.g. Alitalia) or a large proportion of 
business passengers (e.g. BA). SAS effectively offers a three class arrangement with free 
refreshments for full-fare economy passengers as well as a separate business class. 
 
For independent European airlines without a long-haul network to support, business class is 
now effectively dead. Whereas the traditional flag carriers remain wedded to this concept, 
almost all the independent airlines have got out. bmi was one of the last to maintain a two-
cabin arrangement but this is now reduced to a handful of routes (see section 6 above). 
Nevertheless, with the cost levels of the traditional airlines, the opportunity to obtain a few 
passengers paying £300 each way, for the sake of putting up a curtain and buying in a few 
hot meals, still seems attractive compared to taking dozens down the back at £30. 
 
8. Reduce distribution costs 
 
One area where the low-cost airlines have managed to reduce expenses with negligible 
impact on standards of service, as perceived by the passenger, is through axing 
commissions to travel agents. The view of traditional airlines was that travel agents were 
necessary to distribute their product as widely as possible, particularly in areas away from 
 the home market. If one airline stepped out of line then the agents would push all the 
business to their rivals, losing them much more than the 9% commission. This assumption 
began to change for several reasons however. By turning price into the major selling point - 
with fares 50% or more below the traditional airlines - the low-cost airlines found 
passengers would book the low fares even if it meant using different distribution channels. 
Internet penetration was growing rapidly, providing the ability for customers to book their 
own flights using automated systems. A short-haul airline selling simple point-to-point 
flights didn't require complex GDS equipment or yield management. 
 
The network airlines could no longer afford to pay commissions for a service the passenger 
didn't value. There was little incentive for passengers to book direct with the airline when 
the price was the same. Pass the money back to the passenger however and suddenly many 
more people will book direct. It was easiest to do this in the home markets where the airline 
typically has a dominant position through high frequencies/network coverage, FFP 
membership etc. Airlines also needed to incentivise passengers to book through their own 
website by offering the lowest total payment by that method. In overseas markets and for 
smaller airlines however there may be too low a level of awareness for airlines to generate 
much business direct. Many UK passengers, for example, will examine the websites of 
easyJet, Ryanair and BA but overlook carriers such as Air France or Lufthansa. This tends 
to reinforce the national bias among airline customers. Travel agents (including the on-line 
agencies such as Expedia) may still be the best option in these circumstances and even low-
cost airlines have to spend heavily on advertising.  
 
 British Airways commission payments as a proportion of sales have fallen from 14% in the 
financial year ended 1997 to 9% in 2002 and 6% in 2005. Travel agents (including internet 
intermediaries) have been forced to add service fees to maintain their income. This has the 
consequence of driving more customers to book direct and on-line. Table 7 shows the going 
rates for commission in Europe. It is mostly long-haul airlines from other parts of the world 
that still pay generous terms. Another benefit of direct internet sales is the ability to 
automate associated aspects of the travel process such as check-in (Aviation Strategy, 
2004a). 
 
9. Increase aircraft utilisation 
 
The constraints of hub operations do not make it easy to maximise aircraft utilisation. 
Aircraft often have to be left on the ground for longer than the minimum time period in 
order to synchronise with other flights at the hub. Traditional airlines have also scheduled 
longer turn-arounds to allow for catering and cleaning of the aircraft and provide a 
contingency allowance to improve the chance of on-time departure. Passengers find it less 
stressful to stroll onto the aircraft 20 minutes before departure and relax in their seats rather 
than having to wait in the gate area for a last minute boarding call. The use of loading 
bridges provides a higher level of passenger service, particularly in inclement weather 
conditions and for disabled passengers. However it also slows down boarding and alighting. 
This is primarily because only the front entrance/exit from the aircraft can be used whereas 
with steps onto the apron, passengers can board and alight through both the front and rear 
doors, potentially halving the time taken to load or unload. Allocated seats are another 
 delaying factor in the boarding process. Passengers take longer to find their designated seat 
than simply going into the first one available. In the process they may block the aisle 
accessing the overhead bins. The pressure from passengers behind creating a scrum to 
secure the best seats is also removed. The trend amongst low-cost airlines to encouraging 
cabin baggage and minimising the number of checked bags will however have a negative 
impact on turn-around times as passengers take longer trying to stow hand baggage. Indeed 
the UK Department of Transport was threatening to legislate on cabin baggage (Travel 
Trade Gazette, 2006) after security search points became bogged down by passengers 
taking as much as possible on-board due to charges for checked-in bags (e.g. Ryanair or 
flybe) or reduced restrictions on carry-on bags (e.g. easyJet). This saves the airline money 
on ground handling but simply moves the cost somewhere else. Traditional airlines are 
needless to say unhappy that their passengers should be delayed in queues at security 
behind these low-cost travellers. 
 
The traditional European airlines have generally increased the aircraft utilisation of their 
short-haul fleets in response to the low-cost threat (Table 8). This is particularly marked 
with BA, Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS while KLM's utilisation appears to have gone down. 
These figures must be treated with some caution however as fleet renewal and network 
changes mean aircraft types are not necessarily used on the same mix of routes as five years 
previously. British Airways has made some of the greatest strides at Gatwick to emulate the 
low-cost model with earlier starts, later finishes and tighter scheduled turn-arounds (Table 
9) but have retained features such as allocated seats, cleaning and catering and use of 
 airbridges which make it difficult to achieve a 30 minute turn-around particularly with a 
full flight. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that BA often still take 35-40 minutes to turn the aircraft 
around so an on-time departure is only possible if the aircraft actually arrives early. There is 
some contingency in the en-route schedule which may permit an on-time arrival, although 
even this has been pared back by about 5 minutes per sector from the old timetable. 
Whether the yields on the first and last flights exceed the marginal cost of operating at these 
times is an interesting question. With higher fuel prices it must be more difficult. BA 
regularly have their lowest fare on-sale for the very late evening flights, in many cases still 
bookable up until a week or so before departure. 
 
10. Set up a low-cost subsidiary  
 
Numerous attempts have been made by traditional airlines in North America and Europe to 
set up subsidiary carriers on the low-cost/no-frills model as a competitive response to the 
growth of new entrants. The objectives of these carriers are somewhat varied and in many 
cases have not enjoyed great success (Morrell, 2005; Graham and Vowles, 2006). 
 
British Airways set up go to fly from Stansted and subsequently other airports such as 
Nottingham East Midlands and Bristol. They were eventually sold off to a consortium 
involving the management and subsequently taken over by easyJet. 
 
 Lufthansa has an interest in germanwings through eurowings. Research in Germany 
suggests this is an efficient approach to serving different market niches (Lindstadt and 
Fauser, 2004). SAS set up Snowflake to take-over low-yield/leisure type routes. Snowflake 
suffered the worst of all worlds - with aircraft and crews seconded from the parent 
company it didn't achieve much cost saving but yields plummeted as feeder traffic to the 
SAS network disappeared and large numbers of seats had to be filled by stimulating the 
point-to-point markets. Snowflake is now merely a booking class on flights that are back 
within the SAS operation. 
 
Another variation on this theme involves handing routes to franchise partners with lower 
cost levels. Most franchises are in the regional sector of the market where the use of smaller 
aircraft is the primary motivation. One notable exception however is GB Airways, the 
British Airways franchise that operates mostly between Gatwick and holiday destinations in 
southern Europe. GB has cost levels (stage length adjusted) around 20% below BA. This 
means that it can operate viably on lower yields and compete more closely on price with the 
low-cost airlines. It nevertheless provides a full BA branded product with the network 
benefits of through fares, interlining and schedule co-ordination, FFP participation. GB 
uses A320 and A321 aircraft. This has been manageable largely because it serves 
destinations that were not in the BA network at all in recent times. Attempts to transfer 
routes from BA mainline to GB with similar size aircraft are likely to meet with union 
resistance. 
 11. Conclusions 
 
Although some of the European flag-carriers such as Alitalia and Olympic continue to rack-
up huge losses, the financial recovery of airlines such as BA, Lufthansa, KLM/Air France, 
Aer Lingus and Iberia provides some evidence that the traditional network carrier model 
can still work. Indeed, apart from Ryanair which has enjoyed very large and perhaps 
somewhat unrealistic profit margins in recent years, the majors are doing as well as 
anybody. easyJet typically makes about a 5% surplus, similar to BA. The other low-cost 
carriers are loss making in many cases and in 2004, Virgin Express became the first to 
surrender to what is effectively a take-over by a traditional airline, SN Brussels. 
 
The most successful strategy for the network carriers in the short-haul market involves 
concentrating on their major hub or hubs and off-loading peripheral routes. Cost reductions 
can be achieved in the first instance by increasing crew and aircraft productivity and 
outsourcing services. The passengers will usually notice little negative impact from such 
changes. Low-cost subsidiaries only appear to be a successful diversification in markets 
away from the main hub cities, although for some of the 'second tier' flag carriers with 
mainly point to point traffic this may effectively mean reinventing the whole airline - as in 
the case of Aer Lingus. In contrast, franchising could be more widely exploited throughout 
the short-haul network. A need to avoid damaging labour disputes may inhibit all these 
cost-reduction measures however.  
 
 The most successful product specification appears to be based on retaining full-service 
business class and a more basic but still free-service economy class. This provides a 
differentiator to the low-cost airlines while being compatible with the long-haul product for 
connecting passengers. Paid for food and drink is not a very efficient option as Lufthansa 
identified with Swiss. Pricing for local passengers needs to be brought in-line with the 
terms and conditions of the low-cost carrier offering, although it should be possible to 
command a premium for a more convenient service (in terms of airports, schedules and 
'frills'). It is becoming increasingly unfeasible to operate a differentiated pricing structure 
with unrestricted and quite possibly loss-making fares where there is competition from low-
cost airlines, while retaining traditional controls on cheap fares in other markets. This also 
raises issues of unfair competition and abuse of monopoly power. Network pricing of 
connecting flights still remains an important competitive weapon for the hub operators, 
which in turn necessitates a GDS presence, although much short-haul traffic can be 
encouraged to book direct. 
 
The European majors are generally in better shape than their US counterparts (the so-called 
'legacy' carriers). They have more emphasis on long-haul travel which is a growing but 
currently less competitive part of the market. They also have a protected position at their 
major hub airports due to capacity constraints. Nevertheless, many of the mainland 
European airlines have not yet felt the full thrust of the low-cost carrier onslaught. There is 
little evidence that operators such as Air France have moved far enough to compete with 
these new entrants. Given the large number of aircraft that easyJet and Ryanair have on 
 order and the increasing saturation of the UK and Ireland markets, the most interesting 
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 Table 1 
Change in traffic and employment levels for European airlines 1999-2004 
Airline Change 1999-2004 2004 
 Traffic (RPK) Employees RPK/employee RPK/employee 
Ryanair +330% +  78% +142% 8765 
easyJet +356% +117% +110% 6685 
GB Airways +  70% +  34% +  27% 3808 
Virgin Atlantic +    3% +    5% -     2%` 3657 
Aer Lingus +  27% -   36% +  99% 3131 
Lufthansa +  17% -     9% +  29% 3011 
British Airways -     8% -   21% +  17% 2077 
Iberia +  15% -     2% +  17% 1745 
bmi  +  56% -   40% +162% 1686 
Alitalia -   18% -     1% -   18% 1639 
KLM/AirFrance +  10% +  23% -   10% 1592 
Flybe +  85% +  26% +  46% 1233 
RPK: Revenue Passenger Km 
Source: Compiled from IATA, Flight International and Airline Business data 
 
Table 2 
Unit costs of regional jets and Boeing 737 
Aircraft type Typical seats Cost per Available  
Seat Mile US cents 
Cost per Flight 
US$ (averaged to 
500  miles) 
Canadair CRJ-200 48 7.86 1592 
Embraer 145 50 6.93 1590 
Boeing 737-300 126 4.09 2912 
Stage length varies from 330 to 640 miles 
Source: costs from Avmark Aviation Economist/Airline Monitor (based on US DoT data) 
 Table 3 
Change in British Airways short-haul operations at Manchester 1997-2005 
Routes with at least 1 weekday frequency; only non-stop frequencies shown 
Excludes code-shares not operated by BA or franchises 
Route July 1997 
weekday service 




Aberdeen (-) 4xATP 3xDH8  
Amsterdam (END) 4x737  Jet2 MAN-AMS 
easyJet LPL-AMS 
Jet2 LBA-AMS 
Belfast City (+) 4xATP 6xDH8 Flybe LPL-BHD 
Flybe LBA-BHD 
Belfast Intl (END) 4xATP  bmibaby MAN-BFS 
easyJet LPL-BFS 
Jet2 LBA-BFS 
Berlin Tegel (-) 2xER4 1xER4 AirBerlin MAN-TXL 
easyJet LPL-SXF 
Billund (+) 2xJ41 1xATP, 1xD38  
Brussels (-) 3x737 2x146, 1xER4  
Cardiff (END) 2xSH6   
Corka  (+) 1xATP, 2xJ41 1xAR1 bmibaby MAN-ORK  
Ryanair LPL-ORK 
Dusseldorf (-) 3x737 3xER4 AirBerlin MAN-DUS 
Edinburgh (+) 5xATP 1xAR1, 5xDH8 Jet2 MAN-EDI 
Flybe LPL-EDI 
Frankfurt(-) 3x737 5xER4  
Geneva (-) 1x737 2xER4 easyJet LPL-GVA 
Glasgow (-) 5xATP 1xER4, 5xDH8 Flybe LPL-GLA 
Guernsey (END) 1xATP   
Hanover (+) 1xATP 2xER4  
Isle of Man (NEW)  5xDH8  
Jersey (-) 2xATP 1xAR1 bmibaby MAN-JER 
Knock (END) 1xATP  bmibaby MAN-NOC 
London Gatwick 2x757, 4x737 2x319, 5x737 Jet2 MAN-LGW 
London Heathrow 2x767, 7x757, 
2x737 
3x757, 8x320  
London Stansted 2xATP, 1xJ41  Ryanair BLK-STN 
Londonderry (+) 1xJ41 1xSF3  
Lyon (NEW)  1xER4  
Madrid (-) 2x737 1xAR1, 1xER4 Monarch MAN-MAD 
easyJet LPL-MAD 




 Jet2 LBA-AGP 
Milan (-) 2x737 1xAR1, 1xER4 Ryanair LPL-BGY 
Nicea (NEW)  1x146 Jet2 MAN-NCE 
Jet2 LBA-NCE 
Oslo (NEW)  1xAR1  




 1xAR1 Ryanair LPL-CIA 
Shannona (+) 2xJ41 1xDH8 Ryanair LPL-SNN 
Southampton (+) 2xATP, 1xJ41 1xER4, 4xDH8 Flybe MAN-SOU 
Flybe LPL-SOU 
Flybe LBA-SOU 
Stuttgarta (NEW)  1xER4  
Venicea (NEW)  1xER4 Jet2 MAN-VCE 
Ryanair LPL-TSF 
Jet2 LBA-VCE 
Vienna (NEW)  1xER4  
Zuricha (NEW)  1xAR1, 1xER4  
a route discontinued from Autumn 2005 
+ increase in seat capacity 1997-2005 
- decrease in seat capacity 1997-2005 
NEW route newly operated by BA 
END route no longer operated by BA 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
Table 4 
Swissair/Crossair/Swiss routes from Geneva 1997 and 2005 
Short-haul routes with at least one weekday frequency non-stop 
Excludes code-shares not operated by SR or LX  
1997: Alicante, Amsterdam, Athens, Barcelona, Basel, Berlin Tempelhof, Bilbao, Brussels, 
Dusseldorf, Lisbon, London Heathrow, London City, Lugano, Marseille, Moscow, Nice, 
Paris CDG, Prague, Rome Fiumicino, Seville, Stuttgart, Toulouse, Vienna, Zurich 
 
2005: Athens, Barcelona, Lisbon, London City, Moscow, Rome, Zurich 
Source: OAG 
 Table 5 
Conditions attached to cheapest round trip excursion fares on traditional European airlines, 
March 2007 









British Airways 0  Yes 0 Yes 
Air France 0 No Sat No 
Lufthansa 0 Yes 2 or Sata Yes 
KLM 2 or Sat No 3 or Sat No 
SAS 0 No 0 No 
Iberia 0 Yes Sat Yes 
Swiss 0 No 2 or Sat Yes 
Alitalia 0 Yes Sata Yes 
Aer Lingus 0 Yes 0 Yes 
a 0 nights to UK 
Source: airline websites 
 Table 6 
Cheapest fares for a day return trip on Wednesday 31st August 2005 (booking Wednesday 
10th August 2005) 
Outbound flight must depart by 0900 and return flight must leave from 1700 
Tickets may be non-refundable/non-changeable 






KL-LCY 354 KL-LCY 335 
KL-LHR 308 KL-LHR 256 
VG-LCY 128 VG-LCY 134 
BA-LGW 117 BA-LHR 105 
BA-LHR 112 BD-LHR 102 
BD-LHR 94 BA-LGW 100 
U2-STN 55 U2-LGW 59 
U2-LGW 53 U2-LTN 48 






AF-LCY 136 AF-LHR 270 
BA-LHR 126 BA-LHR 150 
AF-LHR 105 U2-LTN 68 
BD-LHR 91   






LX-LCY 218 LX-LCY 519 
BA-LHR 178 BA-LHR 395 
LX-LHRa 166 BA-LCY 395 
BA-LCY 144 BA-LGW 395 
U2-LGW 115 LX-LHRa  220 
BA-LGW 112 U2-LGW 119 






IB-LHR 188 IB-LHR 697 
BA-LHR 148 BA-LHR 688 
IB-LGWa 147   
U2-LTN 140   
U2-LGW 125   
BA-LGW 112   
AF-Air France, BA-British Airways, BD-bmi, IB-Iberia, KL-KLM, LX-Swiss, U2-easyJet, 
VG-VLM, a operated by BA   
Source: airline websites 
  Table 7 
Commission rates in Europe 2004 
9%: Air China, BWIA, Emirates, Garudaa, Gulf Air, Koreana, Mexicana, Olympic, 
 Qatar, VLM 
 
7% ANAa, EVA, Garudab, JAL, LOT, Monarch, South African, US Airways, Virgin 
 Atlantic (Economy) 
 
5% ANAb, DBA, Eastern, Koreanb, Malaysiab, Virgin Atlantic (Premium Economy) 
 
4% Air Canada, CSA Czech, Delta, Finnair, Lan Chile, Maersk, Qantas, Scot Airways, 
Singapore, Thai, Varig, Virgin Atlantic (Upper Class) 
 
1% Standard Rate: All other major airlines 
 
0% SAS (in Scandinavia), ‘Low-cost’ airlines, British Airways (from May 2005) 
a international, b domestic    
Source: Travel Trade Gazette 
 
Table 8 
Changes in aircraft utilisation 2000-2005 (selected short-haul aircraft) 




British Airways A319 6:56 8:45 
 737-400 8:04 9:01 
Lufthansa A319 7:52 9:42 
 737-500 7:22 7:55 
Air France A319 7:52 8:59 
 A320 7:58 8:10 
KLM 737-300 8:26 7:18 
 737-400 8:11 7:36 
Iberia A319 6:10 8:59 
 A320 7:05 8:10 
SAS 737-800 7:06 8:09 
 737-700 7:36 8:29 
Swissair/Swiss A319 8:18 8:34 
 A320 8:48 9:40 
Source: IATA World Air Transport Statistics 
 
 Table 9 
Changes in aircraft scheduling and utilisation - an example 
OLD 2002 
Gatwick 0700 Edinburgh 0830 
Edinburgh 0910 Gatwick 1035 
Gatwick 1130 Glasgow 1300 
Glasgow 1345 Gatwick 1515 
Gatwick 1605 Edinburgh 1735 
Edinburgh 1815 Gatwick 1945 
Gatwick 2025 Glasgow 2150 
10:20 utilisation 
7 sectors 
14:50 start to finish of day 
average turnaround 45 min 
NEW 2005 - stretch the day and shorter turn-arounds 
Gatwick 0625 Edinburgh 0750 
Edinburgh 0825 Gatwick 0950 
Gatwick 1025 Glasgow 1155 
Glasgow 1225 Gatwick 1350 
Gatwick 1445 Manchester 1545 
Manchester 1615 Gatwick 1715 
Gatwick 1750 Newcastle 1900 
Newcastle 1930 Gatwick 2045 
Gatwick 2120 Glasgow 2240 
11:30 utilisation 
9 sectors 
16:15 start to finish of day 
average turnaround 35 min 
